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Narrative and fistory 
-A critical reading of I?. Jameson's "On Interpretation"- 
This essay aims to read critically Fredric Jameson's essay "On 
interpretation", the first chapter of his seminal book, The Political 
Unconscious, in conjunction with a reading of de Man, focusing on 
the issue of the relationship between narrative (and more broadly, 
language) and history. Jameson's project in this essay is very 
ambitious to the extent that he attempts to incorporate all 
thinkable critical methods into his own suggestion of a new 
Marxian interpretation. This project is well summarized in his 
scandalous motto: "Always historicize!"l) As is made explicit in this 
short dictum, the notion of history and historicity constitutes a point 
of departure for Jameson's work. 
Jameson contends that the projects of formalism, structuralism 
and post-structuralism, lacking an authentic notion of history2) and 
1) Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic 
Act (London: Methuen, 1981) 9. Hereafter, page references will be identified in 
the text. 
2) As for Jameson, history is nothing less than the absent cause of narratives, in 
that history is not accessible without prior narrativization. Jameson is much 
indebted to Althusser's notion of structural causality opposed to Hegelian 
the notion of diachrony, should be inevitably imprisoned within the 
boundary of the "linguistic model", ultimately translating all 
narrative forms into the axis of synchrony. Jameson's final 
touchstone to evaluate any theories arises from his elaboration on 
the issue of diachrony and historicity.3) This critique of so-called 
formalistic theories might be traced back to Jameson's earlier work, 
The Prison-House of Language (1972). In this book, he takes pains 
to examine the absence of temporality in the problematic of (post) 
structuralism. He writes: "Thus a new and profoundly historical 
awareness of time is the ultimate form taken by the Saussurean 
play of Identity and Difference: presence and absence in the 
moment itself, the generation of time out of stillness before our very 
eyes. With this, structuralism touches its outside limit, and it is 
worth pointing out that temporality here has become visible in 
Structuralist terms only because it is the temporality latent within 
the sign itself; and not t h  temporality of the object, not that of lived 
existence on the one hand, or of history on the other."4) In this 
passage, Jameson makes sure that "the awareness of time" becomes 
a kind of impassable limit of (post) structuralism based on the 
- 
expressive causality for the re-definition of hlstory. In this sense, Jameson's 
notion of history lies in very similar position to Lacan's conception of the real. 
3) It does not seem too bold to argue that Jameson's notion of the hachronic or 
historicity has, in a sense, something in common with de Man's notion of 
temporality, though with much theoretical difference due to the unmistakable 
breach between their concerns. 
4) Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of 
Structuralism and Russian Formalism ( Princeton UP, 1972) 187-88; my 
emphasis. Henceforth, this book will be abbreviated as PH with page reference 
in the text. 
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premise of diachrony, stripped of the notion of a temporality of the 
object. The last sentences italicized are noteworthy. The newly 
recognized temporality is "the temporality latent within the sign 
itself, and not the temporality of the object." Put differently, 
according to Jameson, the newly envisioned temporality in 
structuralism is not the same as the temporality of lived experience 
or history. This poses a new question: what is the connection 
between "the temporality latent in the sign itself' and "the 
temporality of object" of history? This question is of significance, 
now that the notion of historicity or temporality serves as a vantage 
post for Jameson's reflection on the new Marxian hermeneutics. 
This question leads to my concern for the relation between 
narrative (and language) and history. And this concern demands a 
certain exploration of the nature of language and history. In The 
Prison-House of Language, however, Jameson does not directly 
delve into this pivotal question in depth. Instead, he takes a detour 
by way of a critical analysis of Derrida and Foucault, for the 
purpose of posing the issue of history. 
Jameson is, on the one hand, not averse to praising Derrida's 
"deconstruction" of the old-fashioned schema regarding the 
relationship of thought and words. Jameson, on the other hand, is 
also very critical of the Derridean notion of script or trace: "In the 
very act of repudiating any ultimate or transcendental sigmfied, 
any concept which would dictate the ultimate or fundamental 
content of reality, Derrida has ended up inventing a new one, 
namely that of script itself" (PH, 182-183). Derrida's conclusion, in 
Jameson's reading, looks suspiciously "like a metaphysical option, 
and Derrida's notion of the trace suspiciously like yet another 
ontological theory of the type it was initially designed to denounce" 
(PH, 183). It goes beyond the scope of this essay to examine in detail 
the validity of Jameson's critique of Derrida . What is of interest 
here is, with Jameson, the question of whether or not any "radical" 
attempt to dwell on the notion of sign~language deprived of the 
question of historylreality, inescapably results in another 
"metaphysical option." This question underlies my reading of "On 
Interpretation". 
Then, how about Foucault? Jameson keeps Foucault a t  a 
distance, inasmuch as the latter's notion of history is devoid of any 
deep understanding of historical change(or mutation in Foucault's 
terminology): "But now Foucault's framework puts us in a position 
to see why t h s  should be so: one cannot, in other words, reduce 
history to one form of understanding among others, and then expect 
to understand the links between those forms historically. ... All that 
Language as a transcendental signified can do is to understand 
history as one particular mode of discourse, and it remains gaping 
with amazement before a succession of forms which history itself 
understands simply as the life cycle of capitalism, fiom mercantile 
to post-industrial stages" (PH, 194; emphasis mine). This argument 
reads two-fold. First, as Jameson admits in "On Interpretation", 
"History- Althusser's 'absent cause,' Lacan's 'Real'-is not a text, for it 
is fundamentally non-narrative and nonrepresentational" (82; 
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Jameson's italics). Jameson is suspicious of Foucault, in that the 
latter is not I l l y  attentive to the nature of history and hstorical 
change. But Jameson, to some extent siding with Foucault, also 
remarks: "history is inaccessible to us except in textual form, 
or ... can be approached only by way of prior (re) textualization7' (82). 
In other words, history as an absent cause cannot be "directly or 
immediately conceptualized by the text." My foregoing question 
reiterates itself here: What is the linking point of these two 
seemingly contradictory premises in Jameson's dictum? What is the 
exact locus of history as "fundamentally non-narrative and non- 
representational," since, interestingly enough, history is to be 
approached only in textual form? 
In an attempt to re-consider the notion of history, Jameson draws 
on Lacan's elucidation of the relation between "the symbolic" and 
"the real." But a certain dilemma of Lacan's seemingly seminal 
examination of Freudian psychoanalysis, reproduces itself in 
Jameson's theory. It suffices here to mention one point. On the one 
hand, in Lacan's terms, the symbolic and the real are to be 
distinguishable in the last stance. In sum, the real cannot be 
unquestionably the same as the symbolic. Interestingly enough, 
nonetheless, the difTerence of the real from the symbolic is possible 
only if the differentiation functions in the realm of the symbolic. 
Consequently, it is hardly possible to draw a line of demarcation 
between these two fields. To my knowledge, this dilemma remains 
insoluble in Lacan7s theory, although Jameson later takes a more 
favorable stance toward Lacan than in The Prison-House of 
Language.5) To be sure, it falls &to the pitfall of naive reading to 
presume that history is immediately conceptionalized by the text 
itself. At this point, Lacan's thought is undoubtedly helpful in 
unearthing the necessity of the symbolic, or, in Jameson7s terms, 
narrativization. Then, what is the locus of history or historical 
change? What follows foretells Jameson's impasse that remains 
unresolved in "On interpretation7': 
To say, as the most consequent theoreticians of Structuralism 
have, that there can be no problem of the referent, inasmuch as 
the latter finds itself constantly reabsorbed into language in the 
form of new sign-systems, is merely to displace the problem, 
which remains intact. For one would be only too willing to admit 
that the infrastructure is itself a sign-system, or a complex of 
such systems, in its own right: what remains to be determined, 
however, is the precise nature of the relationship of such systems 
to those more overtly verbal ones which Mamism sees as forming 
the superstructure. Both synchrony and diachrony are involved: 
for it is not only a question of the coordination of two or more 
systems 'at the same time,' but also of the coordination between 
the changes taking place in  each both separately and 
simultaneously. (PH, 212; emphasis mine). 
This passage raises three disputable issues. First, it is far from 
advantageous to disregard the question of the referent in relation to 
'language in the fonn of new-sign systems." In a crucial deviation 
from what goes by the name of (post) structuralism, Jarneson sheds 
light on the problem of the referent, i.e., history. Secondly, 
5) See Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic i n  Lacan: Marxism, 
Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject"(l977), in The Ideology 
of Theory, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
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surprisingly enough, Jameson is not opposed to the position of (post) 
structuralism (and, in a sense, Lacanian theory of psychoanalysis), 
adding that "infrastructure is itself a sign-system or a complex of 
such system, in its own right." But he does not scrutinize this 
somewhat scandalous dictum. In which own right can the 
infrastructure be itself a sign-wstem? Unavoidably, of course, the 
old-fashioned dichotomy of superstructure as a sign system or 
ideological system and infrastructure as a sort of material reality, 
requires some revisions. Althusser's rigorous reading of Marx, as 
Jameson points out, could be singled out as a good example to 
deconstruct the dogmatized dichotomy. Althusser's work is also 
deeply influenced by Lacan, since the division of infrastructure and 
superstructure is only to be possible in the domain of the sign- 
system, i.e., the symbolic in Lacanian terms. But this thought does 
not necessarily foreclose that the infrastructure should, as I have 
referred to Lacanian dilemma as to the connectedness of the 
symbolic to the real, be a sign-system. This problem illustrates itself 
repeatedly in Jameson's elaboration on the relation between 
narrative and history. Thirdly, Jameson accentuates the task of 
studying the precise nature of the relatedness of infrastructure (or, 
in Jameson's terminology, history) as a particular sign system to 
more overtly verbal ones which Marxism defines as forming the 
superstructure. With regard to the notion of narrative, Jameson is 
in favor of "Levi-Strauss's conception of myth or of primitive art as 
an imaginary resolution of some real social contradiction. ... for all 
practical purposes such a description seems to [Jameson] perfectly 
consistent with Marxism, in that i t  undertakes to reveal the 
function of ideological objects in the conjunctures of class struggle or 
economic development" (PH, 212). Jameson has recourse to Levi- 
Strauss's thought for envisioning the notion of narrative as a 
socially symbolic act. But the question remains unanswered: In 
which way does the re-defined narrative "undertake to reveal the 
function of ideological objects in the conjunctures of class struggle or 
economic development'? This question requires a plausible answer 
in his project. 
Jameson, in "On Interpretation", attempts to provide a "new 
hermeneutic" of narrative , situating narrative as "a socially 
symbolic act." He suggests that the narrative representation of 
history necessarily involves the process of what he calls "a strategy 
of containment." Relying on Freud's and Lacan's psychoanalytic 
reflections on dream, Jameson argues that the act of narrativization 
is, in a similar way to dream-work, an unconscious process rather 
than conscious one. In sum, literary work, like dream-work, 
endeavors to resolve the problems of the real through various 
categories of unconsciousness. A narrative, with Jameson, makes a 
socially symbolic act just as dream has a symbolic sigdicance in its 
relationship to the real. Then, what is the function of interpretation 
for Jameson? The interpretation is archaeologically to recuperate 
the real contradictions of history repressed by the "political 
unconscious" of the writer in the symbolic act of narrativization. 
For Jameson, the practice of interpretation is always an 
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essentially allegorical act, insofar as interpretation always 
presupposes "at least some mechanism of mystification or 
repression in terms of which it would make sense to seek a latent 
meaning behind a manifest one, or to rewrite the surface categories 
of a text in the stronger language of a more fundamental 
interpretive code" (60).@ Consequently, all readings become a sort of 
rewriting of a given text. Then, in which way does this rewriting of a 
given text take effect? Herein lies an interesting comparison 
between Jameson and de Man on the nature of reading. Jameson 
poses a question about the implication of "meaning": "what does it 
mean? " His answer runs as follows: "The question "what does it 
mean?" constitutes something like an allegorical operation in which 
a text is systematically rewritten in terms of some hdamenta l  
master code or 'ultimately determining instance' "(58; the author's 
italic). Thus, any sort of interpretation is supposed to "demand the 
forcible or imperceptible transformation of a given text into an 
allegory of its particular master code or 'transcendental sigmfied' 
"(58). It is made somewhat clear here that a reading is "something 
like an allegorical operation." A given text or material should be 
rewritten in terms of another master code in order to be readable or 
interpretable. A reading is nothing but an allegorical decoding. The 
divergence (along with similarity to) of Jameson's conception of 
allegory from de Man's is not my major interest here. But it might 
not be without interest to note that de Man's following reflection on 
6) In a sense, this remark reads a paraphrase of Freud's definition of the 
interpretation of dream. See, for instance, Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of 
Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965) 168. 
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the nature of reading is in contradistinction to Jameson's: "The 
paradigm for all texts consists of a figure(or a system of figures) and 
its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be closed off by a 
final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural 
superposition which narrates the unreadability of the prior 
narration. ... Allegories are always allegories of metaphor and, as 
such, they are always of the impossibility of reading..."7) 
For de Man, to some extent siding with Jameson, a reading 
generates a "supplementary figural superposition." De Man, by 
contrast, also stresses the impossibility of a final reading, in that the 
reading already presupposes "the unreadability of the prior 
narration." Thus, Jameson's specific notions of "fundamental 
master code," "ultimately determining instance, "or 
"untranscendable horizon" can hardly find their place in de Man's 
vocabulary. It is not my concern here to estimate who is right and 
who wrong. This issue is that into which we are neither obliged nor 
equipped to take up here. But the confrontation of these two 
seminal theoreticians on the nature of reading, leads me to some 
questions of sigdicance. From the de Manian perspective, such a 
crucial notion of Jameson's as history as untranscendable horizon, 
is hardly possible, without reservations, to be incorporated into the 
nature of reading. De Man writes: "It now appears that writing can 
just as well be considered the linguistic correlative of the inability to 
read. We write in order to forget our foreknowledge of the total 
7) Paul de Man, The Allegories of Reading (New Haven: Yale UP, 1979) 205. 
HereaRer, further references to this book will be idenhfied in the text with the 
abbreviated title as AR. 
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opacity of words and things or, perhaps worse, because we do not 
know whether things have or do not have to be understood" (AR, 
203). In particular, the last sentence is worth noting: "we do not 
know whether things have or do not have to be understood." 
Undoubtedly, this argument bases itself on the Kantian 
philosophical notion of "thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich)." In de Man's 
problematic, the question of how to represent or understand 
"things" is far from his major concern. His interest leans toward a 
kind of relativistic view of truth, insofar as "writing can just as well 
be considered the linguistic correlative of the inability to read." He is 
very wary of any kind of absolute touchstone such as  a 
''fundamental master code" or an "untranscendable horizon." Then, 
what confirms the validity of a given writing or reading? De Man 
does not pay much attention to this question. In this respect, de 
Man's position seems to come closer to post-structuralism, not fully 
heedful of the question of the referent or history in Jameson's terms. 
The advantage of a properly Marxian interpretive act, Jameson 
claims, arises from its tireless concern for this question of the 
referent as an untrancendable horizon for any possible i-eading: "in 
the spirit of a more authentic dialectical tradition, Marxism is here 
conceived as that 'untranscendable horizon' that subsumes such 
apparently antagonistic or incommensurable critical operations, 
assigning them an undoubted sectoral validity within itself, and 
thus at  once canceling and preserving them" (10). This is very 
ambitious and provocative declaration. In what sense could 
Marxism be the "untranscendable horizon"? Because, Jameson 
remarks, Marxism addresses chiefly itself to "a recognition of the 
primacy of History itself' (14). But his answer does not fully tackle 
the raised question. Rather, it brings out other questions. Such 
Jamesonian conceptions as "recogmtion," "the primacy of History 
itself' demand of him more detaled explanations, even if one is in 
favor of Jameson's singular Marxian position. The first expression, 
"a recognition" is closely entangled with the nature of reading, 
insofar as recognition is only possible in the form of reading. 
Ironically enough, Jameson, in comparison with de Man's seeming 
neglect of the question of the referent, comes to presuppose, without 
loathing, the possibility of "the recognition of the primacy of 
History." One may wonder at this point whether or not Jameson's 
notion of language is, however apparently intricate or complex, still 
confined to a kind of naive correspondence theory of language. 
There are some evidences for this suspicion, insofar as Jameson's 
whole project is rooted in a Marxian topology clearly expressed in 
his reflection on the relatedness of infrastructure as a particular 
sign-system and superstructure. Inasmuch, however, as language 
is, as Benjamin explicates, "an ultimate reality, perceptible only in 
its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical,"8) it is hardly possible 
simply to presuppose any primacy of a specific concept such as 
history. Jameson, of course, does not wholly belittle the question of 
recognition. He notes: "we never really confront a text immediately, 
in all its freshness as a thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us 
the always-already-read; we apprehend them through sedimented 
layers of previous interpretations or ... through the sedimented 
8) Walter Benjamin, Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 
1986) 322. 
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reading habits and categories developed by those interpretive 
traditions" (9). Roughly speaking, what is at stake is, following 
Jameson, to foreground the interpretive categories or codes through 
which we read or interpret a text. The first sentence addresses itself 
to the meaning of history as "fundamentally non-narrative and non- 
representational," for history comes to us only as a textual form, 
never revealing itself "as its freshness as a thing-in-itself." The 
second passage is also noteworthy, now that it concerns itself with 
the process of historical textualizatioin by which a text is produced 
as an interpretable one. This argument has in common with de 
Man's: "If to read is to understand writing ... then it presupposes a 
possible knowledge of the rhetorical status of what has been 
written. To understand primarily means to determine the 
referential mode of a text and we tend to take for granted that this 
can be done" (AR, 201). 
In sum, an "innocent reading" is impossible as Althusser makes 
e~~licit.9) All reading is destined to have a sort of pre-understanding 
or preconceptions of the process by which a given text is produced 
such as "the rhetorical status of what has been written." But de 
Man's notion of reading is contrasted with Jameson. de Man 
remarks: "there can be no writing without reading, but all readings 
are in error because they assume their own readability. Everything 
written has to be read and every reading is susceptible of logical 
verification, but the logic that establishes the need for verification is 
9) Althusser writes: "But as there is no such things as an  innocent reading, we 
must say what reading we are guilty of." [Louis Althusser, et al., Reading 
Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979) 14; emphasis mine] 
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itself unverifiable and therefore unbounded in its claim to truth" 
(AR, 202). This passage could be read as a powerful refutation of 
Jameson's preoccupation with history as the final horizon of 
verification for any kind of reading or interpretation. As Jameson 
insistently points out, all texts need reading and interpretation. 
Moreover, any kind of reading demands logical verification. There is 
no problem in Jameson's reflection on interpretation so far. But, 
since, as de Man notes, "the logic that establishes the need for 
verification is itself unverifiable and therefore unfounded in its 
claim to truth," it might be said, without much exaggeration, that 
the logic of history cannot necessarily privilege itself as  
untranscendable vantage point for any other logic such as language. 
Jameson is nonetheless intent on privileging the notion of history, 
following Althusser.10) 
rv 
For the project of a new hermeneutic, Jameson suggests three 
"semantic horizons" of interpretation in accordance with three 
10) In a crucial deviation from the notion of history as expressive causality and 
mechanical causality, Jameson resorts to Althusser's notion of structural 
causality as a new de6nition of history. Whereas the expressive or mechanical 
causality does not escape the pitfall of a metaphysics of presence which 
essentializes history or the economic infrastructure as the center of all 
superstructure, the Althusserian notion of strudural causality decenters history 
as the absent cause of narratives rather than representing it as Hegelian Spirit 
in narratives. Jarneson's allusion to the Althusserian re-definition of history is to 
some extent convincing. Apart h m  this merit, however, a problem still remains. 
Chances are that the pre-given advantage of history over any instance of 
theoretical discourse underlies, both positively and negatively, Jameson's 
ambitious attempt to establish a new hermeneutic. 
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different notions of history. The first horizon deals with the 
individual narrative as  an  "imaginary resolution" of the 
contradictions of history in the narrow sense of the latter, i.e., the 
diachronic or political history. The first level of interpretation 
intends to read in a text "a political history, in the narrow sense of 
punctual event and a chroniclelike sequence of happenings in time" 
(75). At first glance, this assertion is very similar to so-called 
historical or sociological camp of criticism. Then, what is the exact 
difference between Jameson's first step of interpretation of the 
political unconscious in a text and of what he would call "ordinary 
explication de texte"? The digerence, he argues, lies in his definition 
of the first level of interpretation, following Kenneth Burke's 
explication, in which "the inhvidual work is grasped essentially as a 
symbolic act" (76; emphasis Jameson's ). What is at issue at t h s  
point is how to specify the notion of "symbolic act." Herein lies some 
theoretical assumptions in re-defining the nature of the literary text. 
First, one is reminded, in reading this definition, of the impact of 
Althusser's provocative definition of ideology: "ideology is a 
'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence."ll) Then, what is the relationship of 
11) Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Monthly &view Press) 
162. Put differently, "ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men 
and their 'world', that is, the (overdetennined) unity of the real relation and the 
imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence. In ideology 
the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that 
expresses a will (conservative, conformist, reformist or revolutionary), a hope or a 
nostalgia, rather than describing a reality." b u i s  Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: NLB, 1969) 233-234; Althusser's italics] 
ideology to the literary text in the Althusserian problematic? To 
state a complex matter simply, the literary text is a kind of 
ideological fom.l2) When these two definitions of ideology and the 
literary text as  an ideological form are brought together, i t  
highlights the meaning of the literary text as a symbolic act: "the 
individual narrative, or the individual formal structure, is to be 
grasped as the imaginary resolution of a real contradiction" (77), 
construing "formal patterns as a symbolic enactment of the social 
within the formal and the aesthetic" (77). Jameson thus adds, "the 
aesthetic act is itself ideological, and the production of aesthetic or 
,narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own right, 
with the function of inventing imaginary or formal 'solutions' to 
unresolvable social contradictions" (79). The reason for it being just 
imaginary resolution is that it 'leaves the real untouched, suitably 
dramatizes the ambiguous status of art and culture" (81). But this 
symbolic act demarcates itself fiom any kind of "reflection theory", 
in that the first is "affirmed as a genuine act albeit on the symbolic 
level" (81; Jameson's italic), whereas the latter merely limits itself to 
"the identification of class motifs or values in a given text, and feels 
its work is done when it shows how a given artifact 'reflects' its 
social background" (80-81). What matters here is the dictum of "the 
imaginary resolution of a real contradiction." This expression is 
deeply influenced by the Althusserian notion of ideology. But a key 
12) See, for example, two Althusserians' co-written essay; Etienne Balibar and 
Pierre Macherey, "On Literature as an Ideological Form'' in Robert Young ed. 
Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1981). 
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issue is still not dealt with in the definition. The expression, "the 
imaginary resolution of a real contradiction" does not successfully 
demonstrate to what extent it differentiates itself &om a theory of 
correspondence (or reflection) as to the relationship between real 
contradiction as an objective referent and the literary text as the 
site of imaginary resolution. The question concerning the nature of 
language is still not on the agenda of Jameson's henneneutic. The 
plight of Jameson's hermeneutic prompts me to question: On which 
ground can Jameson confirm that the literary text is an imaginary 
resolution of a real contradiction? What is the relation of the literary 
act and the real? 
As far as Jameson's theory of interpretation is concerned, the 
literary act "cannot simply allow 'reality' to persevere inertly in its 
own being, outside the text and at distance. It must rather draw the 
Real into its own textures, and the ultimate paradoxes and false 
problems of linguistics, and most notably of semantics, are traced 
back to this process, whereby language manages to carry the Real 
within itself as its own intrinsic or immanent subtext"(81). Let me 
take note of the final sentence. The first expression is in the 
balance: the literary act "must rather draw the Real into its own 
textures, and the ultimate paradoxes and false problems of 
linguistics, and most notably of semantics, are traced back to this 
process." This is a kind of paraphrase of the foregoing explanation of 
the relatedness of the real (i.e., history) as the non-representable to 
the textualization of the real. Then the foregoing question, "what's 
the relation of the literary act and the real?" might be moditied as 
follows: In which process is it possible for the literary act to 
represent the non-representable such as history? Jameson does not 
concern himself with this seemingly important question. He merely 
notes, 'language manages to carry the Real within itself as its own 
intrinsic or immanent subtext." This remark reads in a sense as a 
sort of tautology, not delving into the meaning of the literary text 
and its relation to the real as intrinsic immanent subtext. 
This issue is closely associated with the referential function of 
language. At this point, de Man's thought is helpll in re-examining 
this issue: "The heterogeneous texture of Rousseau's allegorical 
narrative is less surprising if one keeps in mind that his radical 
critique of referential meaning never implies that the referential 
function of language could in any way be avoided, bracketed, or 
reduced to being just one contingent linguistic property among 
others ..." (AR, 207). What deserves attention is that the "radical 
critique of referential meaning never implies that the referential 
function of language could in any way be avoided, bracketed, or 
reduced." Jameson's re-definition of literary text as a socially 
symbolic act could be regarded as a trenchant critique of an old- 
fashioned conception of literary text as immediate, however artistic 
it may be, reference to a given reality. But the "radcal critique of 
referential meaning" of the literary text in relation to reality as 
referent, does not necessarily, as de Man writes, rule out some 
detailed consideration of the referential function of language, 
insofar as "the loss of faith in the reliability of referential meaning 
does not 6-ee the language from referential and topological coercion, 
since the assertion of the loss is itself governed by considerations of 
truth and falsehood that, as such, are necessarily referential"(AR, 
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208). This admonition could be true of Jameson's project itself, since 
Jameson's new hermeneutic seems based on the distrust of "the 
reliability of referential meaning:' The scandalous definition of 
literary text as a symbolic act, not as a mere representation1 
reflection of a social reality, i.e., history, stems h m  this suspicion. 
But, inasmuch as the effect of the symbolic act does not 
automatically exclude the problem of the referential meaning of 
language, the question of how the symbolic a d  of literary language 
incorporates (and at the same time, displaces) the referential (or 
representational) function of language, should not be wiped out of 
the agenda of his project. To reiterate, Jameson's neglect of deep 
explication of the referential meaning of language symptomatically 
reveals itself in his conscious (or unconscious) ignorance of the 
foregoing question: In. which process is it possible to incorporate in 
symbolic act, without forfeiting the function of the referential or 
representation, the non-representable such as history? 
The second horizon of interpretation, employing a synchronic 
notion of history, regrounds the individual text as a parole of the 
class discourse (a collective langue) which is involved in a constant 
dialogic struggle with other class discourses. In this second level, an 
individual text '%as been reconstituted in the form of the great 
collective class discourses of which a text is little more than an 
individual parole or utterance." At this point "the object of study will 
prove to be the ideologeme, that is, the smallest intelligible unit of 
the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of social classes" 
(76). This ideologeme is closely linked to another important notion 
of "class langue." The class langue is never wholly visible and never 
fully present in any one of its individual utterances. This class 
langue is organized around minimal units, the idelogeme. Then, 
what is the exact advantage of this provoking invention of new 
notions? Jameson answers: 'The advantage of this formulation lies 
in its capacity to mediate between conceptions of ideology as 
abstract opinion ... and the narrative materials with which we are 
working here" (87). But it still remains obscure how the mediation 
between the conceptions of ideology as abstract opinion and the 
narrative materials, takes place. Since, as Jameson points out, the 
individual text is a parole and the class discourse is a collective 
langue, it might be too bold to presume that an individual text is a 
part of the whole. Why? Because a parole is not simply a part of the 
langue, if Jameson's Sausseurian metaphor proves to be plausible. 
Jameson is, of course, well aware of this problem, so that he 
documents that class langue is never wholly visible and never fully 
present in any one of its individual utterances. To sum up, the 
Althusserian notion of structural causality , ironically enough, 
keeps Jameson's somewhat naive reflection on the relation between 
whole and part in check. Then, a question springs to my mind: In 
which space does the notion of mediation situate itself, insofar as 
the notion of mediation presupposes a kind of dichotomy or 
expressive causality? Jarneson does not provide any helpful clue in 
this essay, for he does not wholly escape the notion of expressive 
causality. His on-going emphasis on class struggle reads as a 
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powerful impact of the expressive causality well captured in his 
preoccupation with the notion of the final horizon of history. This 
emphasis leads itself to the prioritization' of history as the 
untranscendable horizon of any supposed (Literary) theory. 
Jarneson focuses on the role of class discourse in this second level 
of interpretation. He suggests that "class discourse ... is essentially 
dialogical in its structure" (84; italics Jameson's). And the dialogical 
is essentially an antagonistic one, so that "the dialogue of class 
struggle is one in which two opposing discourses fight it out within 
the general unity of a shared code" (84). Or, differently put, the 
dialogue of class struggle, i.e., class discourse becomes a kind of 
underlying terrain or langue on which the confrontation and 
struggle of specific class discourses are possible. He singles out a 
good example from British history. In his reading, "the shared 
master code of religion becomes, in the 1640s in England, the place 
in which the dominant formulations of a hegemonic theology are 
reappropriated and polemically modified." In consequence, an 
individual text, as the resultant of the second rewriting of a given 
text, is "grasped as a symbolic move in an essentially polemic and 
strategic ideological confrontation between the classes, and to 
describe it in these terms" (85; author's emphasis). Herein, however, 
lies a skillfully presupposed proposition. Let me analyze his 
explanation. First, there is, in reality, an essentially polemic and 
strategic ideological confrontation between struggling classes. This 
constitutes a referent that a text incorporates in itself. Secondly, a 
text moves in this confrontation and describes i t  in terms of 
struggling classes. I do not know exactly how these two propositions 
could come together without some logical flaws. Why should the 
text move in this ideological struggle of the classes? What kind of 
necessity functions here to enforce this move? Isn't it merely the 
invisible work of history? Jameson does not seem prepared to 
provide any detailed answer to these questions. More importantly, 
the expression, "to describe it in these terms," deserves attention. 
What is the meaning of "to describe"? How can this notion be 
congruent with the symbolic move of an individual? Jameson does 
not carefully differentiate several functions of language. In his 
explanation of narrative or language, he appears, by and large, to be 
a bit insensitive to the unique implication of the respective notion 
frequently used in his essay such as representation, symbolic act, 
description and mediation. 
The final horizon pays attention to the synchronic and diachronic 
transformation of the mode of production itself as it is contained in 
the artwork as a part of the collective class discourse. The third 
horizon finally unearths the vast unfinished single master- 
narrative of history or the totality of history as the political 
unconscious of all individual narratives and class discourses. At the 
h a l  level, the question of history is fully discussed, raising not a 
few issues. The notion of history is conceived "in its vastest sense of 
the sequence of modes of production and the succession and destiny 
of the various human social formations" (75). At face value, this 
conception of history could be regarded as an old-fashioned Marxian 
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doctrine of history. Jameson is wary of some possible critiques of his 
position. Thus, he defends himself as follows: "no historical society 
has ever 'embodied' a mode of production in any pure state" (94) and 
"what is synchronic is the 'concept' of the mode of production; the 
moment of the historical coexistence of several modes of production 
is not synchronic in this sense, but open to history in a dialectical 
way" (95). In sum, a specific social formation is, with Bloch, nothing 
other than the synchronicity of the non-synchornicities. 
In the final horizon of interpretation, what modification of the 
concept takes place in the understanding of the relationship of 
individual text and history per se? Jameson hastily disclaims any 
connection with any kind of "homology" of text and history, for 
history itself is far from homogeneous totality. He goes on to write, 
"the temptation to classlfy texts according to the appropriate mode 
of production is thereby removed, since the texts emerge in a space 
in which we may expect them to be crisscrossed and intersected by 
a variety of impulses from contradictory modes of cultural 
production all at once" (95). This explanation requires a detailed 
analysis. First, refuting the old-fashioned notion of immediate 
representation of the homogeneous (expressive) totality, Jameson is 
suspicious of the classification of texts according to one mode of 
production, inasmuch as a social formation actually consists of 
several modes of production, even if one mode of production has the 
initiative as the dominant one among several modes of production. 
As a consequence, the contradictions of a work are far from a mere 
reflection of historical contradictions. Rather, they are the 
"produced consequences of over-determined contradictions. 
Secondly, text lies in the situation criss-crossed and intersected by a 
variety of impulses from contradictory mode of cultural production. 
This situation of intersection results in class discourse that is 
essentially dialogical in its structure. Thus, three sub-levels loom 
here; the contradictory mode of cultural production, class discourse 
and text. Thirdly, the contradictory mode of cultural production 
results from social formation, i.e., history itself. In the process of last 
interpretation, "individual text and its ideologemes know a final 
transformation, and must be read in terms of ... the ideology of form, 
that is, the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence 
of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations 
of modes of production" (76; emphasis Jameson's). What is the 
ideology of form? The ideology of form is "the determinate 
contradiction of the specific messages emitted by the varied sign 
systems which coexist in a given artistic process as well as in its 
general social formation" (98-99). The ideology of form seeks to 
reveal "the active presence within the text of a number of 
discontinuous and heterogeneous formal processes" (99). These 
"formal processes are, however, sedimented content in their own 
right," rather than mere expression of the content. In this sense, 
Jameson calls it ideology of form, instead of ideology of content. 
These formal processes cany "ideological messages of their own, 
distinct from the ostensible or manifest content" of the given work. 
What is of interest here is that each formal process has its own 
ideological messages. This is a sort of transformation of the 
Freudian division of the manifest and the latent content of dream. 
In his earlier book, Jarneson shows his dissatisfaction with the 
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theoretical tendency which limits the function of criticism to the 
interpretation of content: "Thus the process of criticism is not so 
much an interpretation of content as it is a revealing of it, a laying 
bare, a restoration of the original message, the original experience, 
beneath the distortions of the various kinds of censorship that have 
been at work upon it; and this revelation takes the form of an 
explanation of why the content was so distorted and is thus 
inseparable from a description of the mechanisms of this censorship 
itself7'l3) Put another way, the process of criticism should speak of 
the silence of the text, or the unconscious repressed by the text, the 
absent other which is history itself. In the context of Jameson's 
explanation, the censorship by which the content is distorted, is not 
merely the result of institutional censorship of a given society. 
Moreover, Jameson is attentive to the dynamic sign system of class 
discourse that underlies the process of distortion of content. Thus, 
"any stylization or abstraction in its form must ultimately express 
some profound inner logic in its content, and is itself ultimately 
dependent for its existence on the structures of the social raw 
materials themselves."l4) 
The task of ultimate interpretation is "the rewriting of its 
materials in such a way that this perpetual cultural revolution can 
be apprehended and read as the deeper and more permanent 
constitutive structure in which the empirical textual objects know 
intelligibility" (97). In the final horizon of interpretation "the 
13) Fredric Jameson, Marxism and From: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of 
Literature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971)404; my emphasis. 
14) Fredric Jameson, ibid., 403. 
individual tex ... is here restructured as a field of force in which the 
dynamics of sign systems of several distinct modes of production 
can be registered and apprehended (99). He calls this dynamic the 
ideology of form. To reiterate, the individual text is far from an 
immediate representation of a referent. Some processes of 
mediation intervene here. The individual text is, first of all, not 
merely a specific author's work but also a production of the dynamic 
of sign systems in given modes of production, i.e., social formation. 
In addition, the literary text is a record of the dynamics of sign 
systems. This explanation is largely pointed. But, strangely enough, 
,he does not see into how an individual writer incorporates andlor 
displaces such dynamics of sign systems into hidher work. Isn't the 
author merely confined to being an agent in the process of the 
apprehension of the sign-system? I still wonder in which space of 
the process of mediation the author's position is to be located and 
how the author's language situates itselfin this process. 
In the last horizon, history discloses finally itself as the absent 
cause: 'With this final horizon, history itself becomes the ultimate 
ground as well as the untranscendable limit of our understanding 
in general and our textual interpretations in particular" (100). But 
the question of how this proposition escapes the widely held view of 
the Marxian interpretative operation as a logic of reification of 
history, remains intact. In what sense is it possible for history to 
take an ultimate priority over any notion, for instance, language? 
As I have mentioned above, the predominance of history over any 
other category of interpretation including language, comes to 
Jameson as an unquestionable one. The question of history 
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constitutes a hot issue, as Jameson admits, in recent academic 
discourse. Jameson attempts to briefly answer by foregrounding the 
concept of necessity in the Marxian historiography: 'Wecessity is not 
in that sense a type of content, but rather the inexorable form of 
event. it is a kind of a narrative category. And the narrative political 
unconscious is the formal effects of what Althusser calls an "absent 
cause." As a result, '%story can be apprehended only through its 
effects, and never directly as some reified force" (102; Jameson's 
italic). Stil l at this point, the question concerning the possibility of 
apprehension of history as  non-representational, remains 
unanswered. Even though Jameson qualifies the notion of necessity 
as the form of event, the presupposed priority of necessity as 
narrative category is from the outset suggested as the indisputable 
one. To encapsulate, Jameson cannot f d y  escape the effect of the 
Hegelian concept of expressive causality, although he incessantly 
emphasizes that history is far from homogeneous totality.l5) This 
15) Interestingly enough, the implicit notion of history as homogeneous totahty 
underlying Jameson's essay, conjures up a sharp contrast with Walter 
Benjamin's notion of history in terms of historical materialism. Benjamin writes: 
'The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the 
concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time. A critique of the 
concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of 
progress itself." Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1969) 2611 It could be considered, in Benjamin's terms, 
as a symptom of '%istoricismn steeped in Hegelian philosophy of history that 
Jameson does d u d e  Benjamin only one time in footnote in this long essay, in 
which so many contemporary, including not a few Marxian theoreticians, are 
quoted and commented. Jameson only points out in passing to the "religiousn 
content in Benjamin, not discussing Benjamin's seminal notion of history at  all. 
See footnote 48. 
implicit breach of expressive causality and structural causality 
underlies his whole project of new henneneutic, constituting a 
certain impasse. 
